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NATO countries have long been aware of Russia's electronic warfare activities, especially Russia's growing number of jamming and deception systems. Some of these have been shown in Syria and Ukraine, and Russia has dismissed complaints about its jamming or spoofing as free propaganda for the device. Russian GPS jammers have some military use, but are also attractive to non-military customers. For example, in 2016 Russia began shipping a new portable GPS jamming system called the Pole 21. The system is special because the individual Pole 21 units can be installed on existing cell towers (or stand alone on portable towers). Each Pole 21 unit can transmit 20 watts and jamming signals from GPS (and similar GLONASS, Galileo and BeiDou systems) for up to 80 kilometers. The Pole 21 is also designed to act as a backup GSM transmitter for receiving commands from nearby Pole 21 units. In this way, the Russians say, large areas can be quickly protected from GPS-guided missiles and bombs, as well as shutting down vehicle GPS systems. The Russians admit that Pole 21 will also cripple all commercial GPS devices in blocked areas. The biggest problem with the Pole 21 is that Russia has been developing and selling many different GPS jamming systems since the mid-90s, but they have proven ineffective in combat.

Russia's interest in GPS jamming became known to the public in the early 1990s, when the private Russian company AviaConversia was formed to develop cheap, lightweight and reliable GPS jammers. In 1997, the company offered four different models of GPS jammer (about $4,000 each) to commercial and military customers. The device only produces 4-8 watts of power, making it difficult to find and bomb. These jammers have been advertised as being able to effectively block GPS signals at a range of 150-200 km, depending on the terrain. These jammers are battery powered and weigh between 8 kg (18 lbs) and 12 kg (26 lbs) without batteries. During operation, the jammer consumes less than 25 watts of power.

In the mid-1990s, plans to build your own GPS jammer using off-the-shelf parts costing less than $100 popped up on the Internet. Welding skills are required. Soon, similar assembled units will be available on the Internet for as little as $40. At the same time, US GPS experts point out that these jammers do not have enough power to connect to the GPS of most military GPS receivers, but may interfere with many commercial products, especially consumer products. The Air Force later revealed that was indeed the case. This was attempted in Iraq in 2003

By 2002, AviaConversia had disappeared, apparently absorbed by Russia's new classified military jamming efforts. By the 1990s, AviaConversia had established most of its relationship with the Russian Armed Forces, and had tacit assurances that its jammers were working. After 2001, U.S. Department of Defense experiments found that cheap jammers were not as effective, and large jammers built from off-the-shelf components costing nearly $10,000 were largely ineffective against military-grade GPS guidance systems. Meanwhile, the Department of Defense built and tested GPS jammer detectors, as well as homing systems sensitive enough to steer missiles to active jammers.

Back in 2010, the U.S. Department of Defense spent a lot of money developing jam-proof alternatives or backups to GPS (depending on who you talk to). The best candidate is the improved INS, which has been around for nearly a century, but since the 1960s has become smaller, cheaper, and more reliable, just like electronics. Basically, the INS uses three gyroscopes and three accelerometers to continuously measure changes in orientation and velocity. With this, the INS will always know its position relative to its original origin (originally available via unencrypted GPS or older). Miniature INS devices have long served as backups to GPS-guided weapons. But while GPS guidance can land a bomb or missile within 10 meters (32 feet) of a target, INS can only achieve an accuracy of 30 meters. GPS also has the advantage of not having to enter its exact position after the INS is powered up. On the plus side, this means the INS won't get stuck or spoofed. These tiny gyroscopes and accelerometers have become standard in many smartphones to detect not only orientation but also motion. Smartphone makers have used this technology to bring cheaper, more reliable designs that have proven useful for military INS backup of GPS. One target, the INS can only achieve an accuracy of 30 meters. GPS also has the advantage of not having to enter its exact position after the INS is powered up. On the plus side, this means the INS won't get stuck or spoofed. These tiny gyroscopes and accelerometers have become standard in many smartphones to detect not only orientation but also motion. Smartphone makers have used this technology to bring cheaper, more reliable designs that have proven useful for military INS backup of GPS. One target, the INS can only achieve an accuracy of 30 meters. GPS also has the advantage of not having to enter its exact position after the INS is powered up. On the plus side, this means the INS won't get stuck or spoofed. These tiny gyroscopes and accelerometers have become standard in many smartphones to detect not only orientation but also motion. Smartphone makers have used this technology to bring cheaper, more reliable designs that have proven useful for military INS backup of GPS. INS. On the plus side, this means the INS won't get stuck or spoofed. These tiny gyroscopes and accelerometers have become standard in many smartphones to detect not only orientation but also motion. Smartphone makers have used this technology to bring cheaper, more reliable designs that have proven useful for military INS backup of GPS. INS. On the plus side, this means the INS won't get stuck or spoofed. These tiny gyroscopes and accelerometers have become standard in many smartphones to detect not only orientation but also motion. Smartphone makers have used this technology to bring cheaper, more reliable designs that have proven useful for military INS backup of GPS.

After 2010, US researchers created new concepts and techniques that could significantly improve the accuracy and cost of current INS. In 2013, prototypes proved that they could be almost as accurate as GPS and almost as small as GPS. Cost is always a factor, and a new INS is always 10 times more expensive than GPS. But it's a big improvement over what was available before. The new INS can now be used to monitor GPS and alert operators to problems or blockages with their GPS. The new INS is also suitable for some fast missiles that often lose GPS signals while maneuvering. Another urgent task of INS is to alert users that their GPS has been spoofed (send a false signal to lure users). So even if anti-jamming technology can keep pace with jamming technology, there is still a need for new inertial navigation systems. This has resulted in smaller, cheaper and more accurate INS systems. Outside of airlines and commercial shipping, these new INS systems don't have much of a mass market because GPS is reliable enough for most consumers to keep INS devices out of the big market. But the demand from airlines, shipping companies and the military is huge. However, the technology is still popular in smartphones and other consumer products, but not like INS.

Many DoD navigation and electronics experts believe that current anti-jamming efforts are sufficient to keep the use of military GPS viable, but new INS technology is attracting a lot of attention around the world. The military is always appreciated as a backup, because when equipment fails in combat it's literally a matter of life and death. At the same time, the US is building and testing more compact GPS anti-jamming systems for small drones (as small as 200kg/440lbs). This is part of a plan to equip all U.S. drones, even the smallest, with safer GPS. While all drones can be "piloted" by an operator, GPS makes it easier for operators to always know exactly where their drone is, sometimes drones are programmed to simply patrol between a range of GPS coordinates. If the GPS freezes or malfunctions, the operator can often use the video feed to find landmarks on the ground and return the drone to where it can be seen and landed.

While the U.S. military has yet to experience battlefield GPS interference, if any, the threat exists. Currently, the U.S. military can experience this in Ukraine (NATO countries have advisors and military observers) and Syria. This jamming technique is also present in Iraq and Afghanistan. Until then, the most tangible evidence came from North Korea, which has long manufactured, sold and used GPS jammers. In 2012, North Korea attacked South Korea with an extensive GPS jamming campaign. The disruption started in late April and lasted more than two weeks. It took less than a day to confirm that the signal was coming from North Korea, with the main destination being the South Korean capital (Seoul). The interference had little effect on the city itself (the ground jamming signal was blocked by buildings and hills) and was only seen by hundreds of planes taking off and landing from the local airport and more than a hundred ships operating at sea. In all these cases, ships and aircraft are equipped with backup navigation systems that are activated when GPS becomes unreliable. This is how navigation systems are designed, especially those that rely on external (satellite) signals. Inside the city (where the ground-jamming signal is blocked by buildings and hills), only hundreds of planes landing or leaving the local airfield and over a hundred ships operating at sea are visible. In all these cases, ships and aircraft are equipped with backup navigation systems that are activated when GPS becomes unreliable. This is how navigation systems are designed, especially those that rely on external (satellite) signals. Inside the city (where the ground-jamming signal is blocked by buildings and hills), only hundreds of planes landing or leaving the local airfield and over a hundred ships operating at sea are visible. In all these cases, ships and aircraft are equipped with backup navigation systems that are activated when GPS becomes unreliable. This is how navigation systems are designed, especially those that rely on external (satellite) signals. Boats and planes are equipped with backup navigation systems that kick in when GPS becomes unreliable. This is how navigation systems are designed, especially those that rely on external (satellite) signals. Boats and planes are equipped with backup navigation systems that kick in when GPS becomes unreliable. This is how navigation systems are designed, especially those that rely on external (satellite) signals.