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Chinese gangsters appear to have joined the Russian military in developing and using technology to spoof (hijack) GPS signals. The use of the technology has been trialled in Shanghai since 2018. The Chinese approach to GPS spoofing is different from the Russian approach. Although Russian spoofing would result in all GPS devices in an area appearing in the same location instead of their actual many different locations. By contrast, Chinese spoofing shows each ship in a different location when active, but still around the same central point, which is clearly where the spoofing signal is broadcast. What it produces A pattern called a "crop circle". The crew slowly sailing into the port of Shanghai noticed this. In the process, they monitor the position of other ships via their AIS (Automatic Identification System) transponders. Under international law, all large ocean-going ships are required to carry and use AIS equipment that continuously broadcasts the ship's GPS position. However, there are also cases where a ship suddenly notices that the AIS position of a nearby ship has changed. Crew on deck can often see the actual position of other ships with/or without binoculars, while AIS displays show them elsewhere in the circular area. A few minutes later, the AIS signal accurately reported the location again. In this case, it has been noticed that there is no GPS receiver on the boat to receive the signal, as is the GPS device on land in the circle.

The Chinese government denies responsibility for the GPS spoofing and accuses smugglers of apparently using deception devices to avoid being caught by police when smuggling vessels are carrying illegal cargo. In one instance, a smuggler was still caught in an accident involving identity theft, and the smuggler was found to be carrying sand illegally obtained nearby and shipped out of the port for takeaway. Sand mining has been banned in the region because the precious commodity is in high demand elsewhere and exporting more would damage the environment.

People using the new GPS jammer near Shanghai have yet to be caught, in part because the device was apparently only used six times, and only for a short period of time. From the evidence gathered so far, if the jammer is held down long enough, the range and center of the crop circle can be located, and the police will be dispatched to that location to seize the device and the device being used by the person using it.

This isn't the first time criminals have acquired and used electronic signal jamming equipment. Gangster devices are commonly used in some types of radar communication systems. GPS jamming is new, especially in an unprecedented way. But now smugglers at sea use more electronic jamming devices as they try to evade detection and avoid capture once they are detected. Police determined that the spoofing signal appeared to be located inside a building of a local petrochemical company. Searches of the premises and interrogations of those who worked there turned up nothing. here again,

GPS spoofing/jamming systems require skilled personnel to design and build. Chinese gangsters have developed and built sophisticated equipment, but so far police have no idea who it might be. It is suspected that the equipment may be North Korean, as North Korea has developed more sophisticated methods to smuggle sanctioned goods to and from the country. If they created such a device, they would certainly not issue a press release about it, but would sell it for cash or cryptocurrency at the right price.

Users of GPA-interfering devices tend to keep silent about it. Over the past few years, there has been growing evidence that Russia routinely jams or spoofs GPS signals, mostly to hide the exact location of key figures or military units. The development of such a device is easily within Russia's capabilities. In early 2019, a civilian think tank (C4ADS) released a report describing how it found nearly 10,000 cases in which someone (apparently Russia) jammed or spoofed satellite navigation signals. Not only US GPS, but also signals from non-US satellite navigation systems (China's Beidou, EU's Galileo, Japan's QZAA, and even Russia's GLONASS). Much of this activity is not outright interference, but deception. This is apparently an attempt to hide the true location of key Russian officials (like President Putin) and the Russian military. Identity theft is especially common for Russian troops in Ukraine and Syria. Spoofing replaces real satellite signals with fake satellite signals that present an inaccurate smart bomb or planned attack on a target. Identity is especially common among Russian troops in Ukraine and Syria. Spoofing replaces real satellite signals with fake satellite signals that present an inaccurate smart bomb or planned attack on a target. Identity is especially common among Russian troops in Ukraine and Syria. Spoofing replaces real satellite signals with fake satellite signals that present an inaccurate smart bomb or planned attack on a target.

Identity theft is becoming more popular and convenient because it does not require expensive or high-tech equipment. While U.S. military weapons and navigation systems provide backup in the form of rock-solid INS (Internal Navigation System) systems, these are useless if deception goes undetected. U.S. systems should be able to detect spoofing and report it to the INS, but the U.S. has not disclosed details on how these systems work to make modifications to spoofing systems harder to detect. This is one of the reasons why the United States has not released information on counterfeiting incidents. To complicate matters, there are also cases where AIS devices report that they are not receiving any GPS signals. Large ships are usually equipped with two AIS units in case of failure. But when using Shanghai jammers, the AIS sometimes did not receive a signal, causing the alarm to go off.

Complaints are less secretive in other countries, and the culprit is often Russia. In late 2018, Finland and Norway publicly accused Russia of deliberately jamming GPS signals in northern Finland and Norway from a location near a Russian military base on the Kola peninsula in the Barents Sea. The jamming came as NATO held its largest training exercise since the end of the Cold War in 1991. Russia denies responsibility, although it is known to have long-range jammers for GPS and other signals. Norway says targeting jammers at specific locations, but when Russia refuses to admit any involvement

What's curious about this incident is that it had no impact on NATO's military exercises, and even commercial airliners operating in the region have backup systems (INS) in case the GPS signal doesn't work. Potential casualties are civilians using small aircraft or on the ground relying on commercial navigation equipment that uses GPS. Again, this may be the case, as Russian companies have long produced a wide variety of GPS jammer that are generally ineffective against military GPS users, but not for criminals, terrorists, or anyone involved in irregular warfare (such as Russia has been in Ukraine since 2014). When it comes to sabotaging diplomatic relations with Norway and Finland, the two countries don't need to be reminded that Russia is and has always been a bad neighbor. C4ADS concluded that impersonation of a Russian could be a common practice whenever President Putin travels, possibly as a security measure for assassination attempts using explosively armed drones. This has become a common tactic for Islamic terrorists, who see Putin as a prime target for drone strikes. C4ADS concluded that impersonation of a Russian could be a common practice whenever President Putin travels, possibly as a security measure for assassination attempts using explosively armed drones. This has become a common tactic for Islamic terrorists, who see Putin as a prime target for drone strikes. C4ADS concluded that impersonation of a Russian could be a common practice whenever President Putin travels, possibly as a security measure for assassination attempts using explosively armed drones. This has become a common tactic for Islamic terrorists, who see Putin as a prime target for drone strikes.